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OIL AND GAS - INTERPRETATION OF LEASE CONTAINING ROYALTY
PROVISIONS - Several of the plaintiffs owned oil-producing land in Oklahoma
and had leased it to one Briggs. The lease ran for a fixed term and "so long
thereafter as oil or gas may be produced therefrom by the lessee." It provided for
a royalty payment to the lessor of one-eighth of the oil or gas produced, and
gave the lessee the right "at any time" to remove all machinery and equipment
placed on the premises, including the right to draw and remove the casing.
Briggs sold the equipment thereon to defendant and later sold the lease itself
to one of the plaintiffs. Briggs had told the defendant that the land was no
longer producing oil in "paying quantities," so defendant attempted to remove
the equipment without the lessor's consent. The plaintiffs immediately brought
suit in the court of equity to enjoin defendant from removing this equipment.
Held, for the plaintiffs on the grounds that (I) the phrase "at any time" must
be read with other provisions in the lease; (2) the question whether oil was
being produced in "paying quantities" was not to be decided by the defendant
alone, but rather by a joint agreement with the lessor or by judicial determination; and (3) it would be detrimental to the legal interests of the lessor if the
defendant were allowed to remove the equipment. Okmulgee Supply Corp. v.
Anthis, (Okla. 1940) II4 P. (2d) 451 (second rehearing denied June 24,
1941).
The phrase "at any time," commonly found in oil and gas leases with reference to the right of the lessee to remove equipment placed on the premises in
furtherance of oil production, has caused much litigation in the oil producing
states; yet it continues to be a part of every standard lease. Several interpretations of this tenuous phrase are possible. Taken literally, "at any time" seems
to give the lessee the right to abandon oil production without notice and remove
his equipment at his own discretion. No court has ever adhered to this interpretation, realizing that to do so would leave the l~or with no protection
whatsoever.1 Moreover, the courts believe that both lessor and lessee have entered into the lease in search of profits, and the conclusions above would prove
unfair to at least oµe party.2 A second possible interpretation of the phrase would
give the lessee unlimited time after the termination of the lease in which to remove his equipment. Again the courts have come to the lessor's rescue, declaring
with unanimity that the lessee has only a reasonable time in which to remove his
equipment after termination of the lease.8 A third interpretation of "at any time"
1

Orfic Gasoline Production Co. v. Herring, (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 273 S. W.
944; Southwestern Oil & Gas Co. v. Kimball Oil & Development Co., (Tex. Civ. App.
1920) 224 S. W. 1 II 1; Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. v. Callender, 84 Mont. 178,
274 P. 834 (1929). The case of Shellar v. Shivers, 171 Pa. St. 569, 33 A. 95 (1895),
came closest to saying that a lessee could remove "at any time" during the lease. However, the statement made was merely in dictum, and made on the ground that the equipment was "trade fixtures." The decision itself has never been quoted as advocating
removal at the lessee's discretion.
2
Orfic Gasoline Production Co. v. Herring, (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 273 S. W.
944; Ohio Oil Co. v. Griest, 30 Iitd. App. 84 (1902); Collins v. Mt. Pleasant Oil
& Gas Co., 85 Kan. 483, 118 P. 54 (1911); MERRILL, CovENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL
AND GAS LEASES, 2d ed., § 8 3 ( I 940).
8
Louisiana Oil Refining Corp. v. Haltom, 188 Ark. n7, 64 S. W. (2d) 98
(1933); Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Barlow, 141 La. 52, 74 So. 627 (1917);
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is that the phrase refers only to that part of the standard lease which states that
the lease shall continue to run for an indefinite period after the fixed term so long
as oil and gas are produced in "paying quantities." 4 Under this interpretation, the
lessee has often argued that he is entitled to determine for himself when the
lease has stopped producing in "paying quantities." 5 However, most courts
even refuse this interpretation, saying that if the lessee and lessor cannot agree.
on this question, it must be left to judicial determination. 6 From the foregoing,
it is apparent that the courts favor the lessor's position even in the face of a seemingly obvious reservation in favor of the lessee. The courts have set a course of
decision which is based on conservation of natural resources and thrifty use of
land,7 and the lessee's interest are considered secondary. The trend of the cases
suggests several important problems. First, how can parties phrase their leases if
they actually desire the lessee to have a right of removal "at any time" at his
own discretion? Under the decisions as they stand today, no consideration has
been given this possibility. Second, what recourse has the lessee, who, knowing
definitely that the lease is no longer capable of producing in "paying quantities,"
discovers that he has a stubborn lessor who demands a judicial determination of
the question even though the lessee has a chance to use his equipment at a profit
elsewhere? Must the lessee sit idly by and wait for a trial, the outcome of which
is quite obvious, thereby losing valuable time and profits, and yet be given no
recourse against the lessor? 8 The conclusion is that the courts have become
Meers v. Frick-Reid Supply Corp., (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) 127 S. W. (2d) 493;
Shellar v. Shivers, 171 Pa. St. 569, 33 A. 95 (1895); In re Midland Oil Co., (C. C. A.
5th, 1924) 3 F. (2d) II2; Gartlund v. Hickman, 56 W. Va. 75, 49 S. E. 14 (1904).
These cases are in line with, and apparently based on, cases pertaining to fixtures
which hold that fixtures become a part of the realty if left on the premises an unreasonable length of time after the expiration of the lease. Robinson v. Harrison, 237 Pa.
613, 85 A. 879 (1912); Sanders v. Davis, 79 Okla. 253, 192 P. 694 (1920).
4 For an excellent discussion of what constitutes "paying quantity," see the note
in 48 A. L. R. 887 (1926). Shellar v. Shivers, 171 Pa. St. 569, 33 A. 95 (1895).
5 This was one of the arguments used by the defendant in the principal case, but
it was rejected by the court.. The argument was also employed in the following cases:
Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. v. Callender, 84 Mont. 178, 274 P. 834 (1929);
Warner v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 132 Kan. 834, 297 P. 682 (1931).
6 Warner v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 132 Kan. 837, 297 P. 682 (1931); Collins
v. Mt. Pleasant Oil & Gas Co., 85 Kan. 483, II8 P. 54 (1911); Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. v. Callender, 84 Mont. 178, 274 P. 834 (1929).
7 ln Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. v. Callender, 84 Mont. 178, 274 P. 834 (1929),
the court stated that if the casing of the well were withdrawn at lessee's discretion, the
well would be destroyed and the whole structure of the tract would be in danger of
having the oil sands flooded with water. This danger has been alleviated by state statutes
requiring that every well be plugged up when abandoned. In Wisconsin-Texas Oil Co.
v. Clutter, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 258 S. W. 265, the court pointed out that permission to lessee to remove the casing would result in waste and destruction of the very
production which was sought to be obtained through the lease. These two cases show
that the courts refuse to aid the lessee in any activity which may result in temporary or
permanent injury to the lessor's realty or to the source of the oil and gas.
8 If the lessee grows impatient, and seeks to take advantage of self-help, the lessor
is in a position to enjoin such activity, as in the principal case. Should the lessee wait
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overzealous in an attempt to aid the lessor, forgetting momentarily the plight of
the lessee who is relying on the terms of his lease. A new basis for adjustment
in these cases must be discovered, one which will take into consideration not only
the lessor's economic situation but also that of the lessee, one in which the circumstances of the particular case will play·a greater part in the determination of
the issue, and one flexible enough to allow the lessee to use his equipment to its
best advantage without undue injury to the lessor. Priority regulations during
the present war will undoubtedly cause the problem discussed above to become
increasingly prevalent in the courts. The lessee will not be able to acquire material for new casings, and will be desirous of shifting old casings to its most productive wells. This will result in the inevitable clash of interests between lessor
and lessee, and our courts will have the responsibility of working out a just and
equitable solution.9
Brooks F. Crabtree

for trial and win, there is no apparent remedy against the lessor for loss of time and
money, because the lessor has done nothing beyond the terms of the lease. It would be
seemingly impossible for the lessee to prove a malicious intent on the lessor's part, for
the reason that said lessor is deeply interested in preserving his realty and getting as
much benefit as possible out of the lease.
9 A suggested solution to the problem would be to have an evaluation of the lessee's
property on the lessor's land, and the establishment of a rental schedule whereby the
lessor would pay the lessee for the use of his casing, with a final relinquishment of this
property to the lessee when the well finally ceases to produce in "paying quantities."

